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STATE -BUILDING , CONQUEST , AND
ROYAL SOVEREIGNTY IN PRUSS IA ,
–*
J A S P ER HE INZEN
University of York
A B S T R A C T . Since Bodin, scholars have been debating whether sovereignty is indivisible or rather
decentred, multiple, and shared. This article adds to practice-oriented conceptualizations of sover-
eignty, which acknowledge the existence of jurisdictional pluralism in nineteenth-century state-
building. Borrowing from imperial history, it contrasts the nominal supremacy of the Prussian
crown – as embodied by the monarchical principle – with the residual sovereign rights of potentates
that had lost their lands in Germany’s successive wars of unification. The possession of ‘bare sover-
eignty’ allowed such mediatized princes and exiled rulers to maintain a presence in the lives of their
former subjects. They did so by exercising privileges and functions of royalty which left vague in whose
name was being governed. The Hohenzollerns for their part struggled (and to a certain extent proved
unwilling) to assert exclusive dominion because right of conquest-based justifications had no firm
standing in international law, alienated segments of domestic public opinion, and did not necessarily
serve the interests of the state. The article argues, ultimately, that the resulting negotiation and con-
testation of monarchical sovereignty in Prussia speaks to global themes of state-building through state
destruction in the Age of Empire.
Five years before his death in , the Swiss-German pioneer of international
law Johann Kaspar Bluntschli published his thoughts on the genesis of the
modern state. Summarizing the intellectual yields of a fifty-year career,
he posited in Lehre vom modernen Staat that sovereignty had become an exclusive
good in the era of the nation-state. Unlike the middle ages, when monarchs had
supposedly been the supreme proprietors of the whole land and subjects held
their estates as fiefs, public law now adhered to the principle that the territory
* I am grateful to Stuart Carroll, Jan Rybak, the anonymous reviewers, and the co-editor of
the Historical Journal, Sarah Pearsall, for their constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this
article. Needless to say, all responsibility for remaining imperfections is my own.
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of a state was inalienable and indivisible. Consequently, it was ‘no longer pos-
sible to do as the mediaeval princes did, who sold, or pawned, or partitioned
their domains as pieces of private property’. This bold claim about the attain-
ments of Western civilization seemed to be confirmed by the proliferation of
international conventions like the  Paris Declaration Respecting
Maritime Law that recognized the sovereign character of signatory and acced-
ing states. Yet what Bluntschli left unsaid was that the emerging frameworks
of international law reinforced another mainstay of nineteenth-century political
history: conquest. In an era of imperial expansion, treaties hid asymmetries of
power by affirming the equality of victors and vanquished on a symbolic plane.
European powers established protectorates around the globe, which left suzer-
ainty nominally in the hands of the weaker party, because they appreciated the
benefits of jurisdictional grey-zones. Partnering up with local rulers reduced
the need for expensive garrisons of occupation, obviated international resistance
to outright annexation, and shored up the tenuous loyalties of new subjects.
The contrast between the theory and practice of governance in the nine-
teenth century lends weight to recent efforts across different disciplines to
rethink the plural and divisible applications of sovereignty as activity in relation
to the unified and inseparable character of sovereignty as doctrine. The exer-
cise of jurisdiction, James J. Sheehan usefully suggests in this context, ‘is best
understood as a set of claims made by those seeking or wielding power,
claims about the superiority and autonomy of their authority. State making,
therefore, is the ongoing process of making, unmaking, and revising sovereign
claims.’ This injunction usefully highlights that even the most asymmetric
transfers of sovereignty through conquest are ultimately incomplete. Consider
in this context Lauren Benton’s claim that in relegating indigenous leaders
 Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, The theory of the state [Lehre vom modernen Staat], trans. Batoche
Books (Kitchener, ON, ), pp. –.
 See Jan Martin Lemnitzer’s insightful analysis of the Paris Declaration in Power, law and the
end of privateering (Basingstoke, ).
 Jörn Leonhard, ‘Kommentar und Ausblick: Protektion und Protektorate im langen .
Jahrhundert’, in Tilman Haug, Nadir Weber, and Christian Windler, eds., Asymmetrische poli-
tische Beziehungen zwischen Partnerschaft und Dominanz (. bis frühes . Jahrhundert) (Cologne,
), pp. –; Wolfgang Egner, Protektion und Souveränität: Die Entwicklung imperialer
Herrschaftsformen und Legitimationsfiguren im . Jahrhundert (Berlin, ); Andrew
Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, property and empire, – (Cambridge, ); Tanja Bührer,
Flavio Eichmann, Stig Förster, and Benedikt Stuchtey, eds., Cooperation and empire: local realities
of global processes (New York, NY, and Oxford, ); E. C. S. Wade, ‘Habeas Corpus – is a pro-
tectorate foreign territory?’, Cambridge Law Journal,  (), pp. –.
 James J. Sheehan, ‘The problem of sovereignty in European history’, American Historical
Review,  (), p. . See also Jens Bartelson, ‘On the indivisibility of sovereignty’,
Republics of Letters,  ( June ): http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/; Gregor Feindt,
Bernhard Gißibl, and Johannes Paulmann, eds., Kulturelle Souveränität: Politische Deutungs- und
Handlungsmacht jenseits des Staates im . Jahrhundert (Göttingen, ); and Wencke
Meteling’s summary of the conference ‘The politics of sovereignty and globalism in modern
Germany’ held at the German Historical Institute in Washington DC on – March ,
GHI Bulletin,  (), pp. –.
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to a place of liminality in the edifice of European empires, ‘[i]ndeterminacy was
being articulated as policy – even as a core principle of an imperial law based on
divisible sovereignty’ in the case of British India. In the words of one British
government official from , defining where a ruling prince merged into a
British subject at times seemed ‘beyond the power of language’. Benton
notes that in such a fluid environment paramountcy resided in the prerogative
of the imperial power to decide when to let politics rather than the law speak. By
the same token, the colonial state could also decide not to intervene in the
affairs of conquered grandees, thus ensuring that they retained a minimalist
or nominal modicum of ‘bare sovereignty’. The choice to leave Indian
princes with trappings of bare sovereignty coincided with a path-breaking tran-
sition in international law away from universal natural law towards a positivist
concern with custom. Thus, whereas the older rhetoric of universalism pre-
sumed the existence of a higher morality in all civilizations and states, positivist
legal frameworks required more culture-specific forms of consent.
Benton insists that European polities also preserved ‘anomalous enclaves and
loosely configured corridors of imperial control’, yet this insight remains inci-
dental to her work. Building on the historiographical convergence of
German and global history in the last decade, this essay argues that Prussia,
much like the maritime empires of Britain or France, experimented with sover-
eignty in the wake of conquest. Twice the Hohenzollerns made territorial gains
by force in the period under investigation, first in  when they absorbed the
lands of mediatized princes and again in  when they annexed several of
Austria’s north German allies. Learning from Prussia’s own experience of
defeat and occupation at the hands of Napoleonic France in , reform-
minded statesmen such as Reichsfreiherr Karl vom Stein and Prince Karl
August von Hardenberg promoted an ideology of ‘enlightened nationalism’
that aimed to ‘reconcile a sovereign monarch with a politically active citizenry’,
 Lauren Benton, A search for sovereignty: law and geography in European empires, –
(Cambridge, ), p. .
 Ibid., pp. –. See also Tanja Bührer, ‘Cooperation and cultural adaptation: British
diplomats at the court of the Nizam of Hyderabad, c. –’, in Bührer, Eichmann,
Förster, and Stuchtey, eds., Cooperation and empire, pp. –; Saliha Belmessous, ed., Empire
by treaty: negotiating European expansion, – (Oxford, ).
 Antony Anghie, Imperialism: sovereignty and the making of international law (Cambridge,
), pp. –. See also Martti Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations: the rise and fall of inter-
national law, – (Cambridge, ), ch. .
 Benton, A search for sovereignty, pp. –; Wolfgang Neugebauer, Wozu preußische
Geschichte im . Jahrhundert? (Berlin, ), p. ; Mark Hewitson, Germany and the modern
world, – (Cambridge, ); Jasper Heinzen,Making Prussians, raising Germans: a cul-
tural history of Prussian state-building after civil war, – (Cambridge, ); Christopher
Clark, ‘After : the European revolution in government’, Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society,  (), pp. –; Mark Tilse, Transnationalism in the Prussian east (Basingstoke,
); Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, );
H. Glenn Penny, ‘German polycentrism and the writing of history’, German History, 
(), pp. –.
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as Matthew Levinger has put it. Their proposed remedy for Prussia’s hetero-
geneity was the development of a normative sphere where subjects could
express concerns locally through consultative bodies in the expectation that
the king would act as final arbiter. In this scenario, the right to rule derived
from an implicit social contract between the monarchy and the people. The
revolutionary turmoil of  broke down the last barriers to the establishment
of a state parliament and even the promulgation of a constitution. While the
granting of these concessions at the king’s pleasure was hardly exceptional
(Louis XVIII had done the same when he issued the Charte constitutenelle
upon his ascension to the French throne in ), historians have long
debated whether the continuing affirmation of royal supremacy tempered by
‘self-imposed’ restrictions made Prussia’s constitutional monarchy a distinctive,
self-contained expression of sovereignty, or rather represented an intermediary
stage on the road to parliamentary rule. Recent scholarship attests to overlap-
ping sources of metajuridical authority that defy a clear-cut answer. Some his-
torians, notably Frank-Lothar Kroll, see the expanding consultative role of
parliament moving in step with other Western European countries, even
though outright appeals to ‘popular sovereignty’ (Volkssouveränität) remained
limited in German texts at the time. Alternative explanations that emphasize
the persistence of royal hegemony meanwhile fall short where they measure the
decisions of the crown by the standards of twenty-first-century democracy, and
naturally find them wanting.
The present article proposes to re-examine the Hohenzollern dynasty’s claim
to leadership from a fresh angle. It does so by arguing that challenges to the
monarchical principle before national unification in  did not only come
from liberal demands for greater parliamentary agency but also the residual
 Matthew Levinger, Enlightened nationalism: the transformation of Prussian political culture
(Oxford, ), p. .
 Christopher Clark, Time and power: visions of history in German politics, from the Thirty Years’
War to the Third Reich (Princeton, NJ, ), pp. –.
 The literature on constitutionalism and Prusso-German parliamentary politics is exten-
sive, but for a representative sample of the latest scholarship, see Hans-Christof Kraus, ‘Die poli-
tische Neuordnung Deutschlands nach der Wende von ’, in Winfried Heinemann, Lothar
Höbelt, and Ulrich Lappenküper, eds., Der preußisch-österreichische Krieg  (Paderborn,
), pp. –; Philipp Erbentraut, Theorie und Soziologie der politischen Parteien im deutschen
Vormärz, – (Tübingen, ). On the Huber–Böckenförde debate, which kick-
started the original controversy, see Martin Kirsch, Monarch und Parlament im . Jahrhundert:
Der monarchische Konstitutionalismus als europäischer Verfassungstyp – Frankreich im Vergleich
(Göttingen, ), pp. –.
 See Matthew Fitzpatrick, ‘A state of exception? Mass expulsions and the German consti-
tutional state, –’, Journal of Modern History,  (), pp. –.
 Frank-Lothar Kroll, Geburt der Moderne: Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg
(Berlin, ), pp. –; Duncan Kelly, ‘Popular sovereignty as state theory in the nineteenth
century’, in Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner, eds., Popular sovereignty in historical perspective
(Cambridge, ), p. .
 See, for instance, Hartwin Spenkuch, Preußen – eine besondere Geschichte: Staat, Wirtschaft,
Gesellschaft und Kultur, – (Göttingen, ), pp. –.
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rights of mediatized and dethroned princes. The German Confederation was
home to no fewer than  reigning dynasties as well as about  lesser stande-
sherrlich families. Many minor sovereigns had been unable to defend their
autonomy against the shifting political tides of the Napoleonic Wars, a fate
several of the remaining princes – among them the king of Hanover, the
elector of Hesse-Kassel, and the duke of Nassau – were destined to share after
picking the wrong side in the German civil war of . Thomas Biskup and
Martin Kohlrausch have therefore gone so far as to suggest that ‘for German
dynasts…the greatest threat emanated not from revolution but other German
monarchs that wished to depose them by force’. Yet, paradoxically, the
losers of this power struggle were slow to lose their sovereign attributes.
Amongst other privileges, Article  of the  German Federal Act
confirmed mediatized houses’ dynastic equality with reigning monarchs and
permitted them to dispense various forms of local justice. Perhaps most tell-
ingly, the Prussian crown agreed to conclude a treaty with exiled King Georg
V of Hanover in  which provided for his material comfort without requir-
ing him to renounce his sovereignty.
The suspended state of animation of vanquished dynasts raises intriguing
questions about the exercise of royal dominion. For example, it invites us to
reconsider continuities in Prussian state-building. Contemporary legal scholars
and modern historians have so far stressed the fundamentally different politico-
legal position of Standesherren and dethroned monarchs. They point to the fact
that the two groups formed no common legal estate. Mediatized princes, writes
Jonathan Spangler, were ‘neither typically noble nor strictly speaking royal’.
The majority of these semi-royal grandees were prepared to recognize
Hohenzollern overlordship in return for material compensation and social dis-
tinction, whereas fully royal exiles such as Georg V and Friedrich Wilhelm I of
Hessen-Kassel steadfastly refused to enter into agreements that compromised
their sovereign standing. Similarly, although European courts had no qualms
about affirming the mediatization of Standesherren at the Congress of Vienna
 Dorothee Gottwald, Fürstenrecht und Staatsrecht im . Jahrhundert: Eine wissenschaftliche
Studie (Frankfurt a. M., ), p. . For slightly diverging estimates, see Heinz Gollwitzer,
Die Standesherren: Die politische und gesellschaftliche Stellung der Mediatisierten, –: Ein
Beitrag zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte (nd edn, Göttingen, ), p. ; and Vahlteich, Die
deutschen Standesherren: Ein Überblick über ihre Lage und Verhältnisse (Jena, ), pp. –.
 Thomas Biskup and Martin Kohlrausch, ‘Das Erbe der Monarchie: Nachwirkungen einer
deutschen Institution’, in Thomas Biskup and Martin Kohlrausch, eds., Das Erbe der Monarchie:
Nachwirkungen einer deutschen Institution seit  (Frankfurt a. M., ), p. .
 Torsten Riotte, Der Monarch im Exil: Eine andere Geschichte von Staatswerdung und
Legitimismus im . Jahrhundert (Göttingen, ), p. .
 Jonathan Spangler, ‘Those in between: princely families on the margins of the Great
Powers: the Franco-German frontier’, in Christopher H. Johnson, David W. Sabean, and
Simon Teuscher, eds., Transregional and transnational families in Europe and beyond: experiences
since the middle ages (New York, NY, and Oxford, ), p. . See also Willibald Steinmetz,
Europa im . Jahrhundert (Frankfurt a. M, ), pp. –; Heinrich Bernhard
Oppenheim, System des Völkerrechts (Frankfurt a. M., ), p. .
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in , they felt conflicted about the dethronement of close relatives at the
end of the Austro-Prussian War. Heinz Gollwitzer therefore concludes that
instead of being natural allies, the losers of  and  remained too
divided by history, international politics, and even economic circumstances to
find much common ground.
The prevailing concern with difference occludes important connections
between the two dynastic communities, however. Chief among them are their
common origin. Prior to , every prince belonged in principle to the high
nobility (hohe Adel) that had a seat in the Imperial Diet and ruled over a territory
that was only immediate unto the Holy Roman Empire. Power was dispersed
in such a setting. ‘Unlike nations and states’, James J. Sheehan has observed,
‘the Reich did not insist upon pre-eminent authority and unquestioning alle-
giance. Its goal was not to clarify and dominate but rather to order and
balance fragmented institutions and multiple loyalties.’ Despite the reforma-
tory impulses of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, composite
statehood remained an attractive model throughout central Europe, which
both satisfied nostalgic longings for a return to pre-modern systems of order
and responded to the eclecticism of new administrative structures. The ambi-
tious Hohenzollerns were no less alive to these advantages than their Austrian
competitors. For instance, when Prussia proceeded to digest the spoils of the
Third Partition of Poland (), the authorities left the old municipal elites
in post for a while because their continued presence made the rupture of
regime change less apparent. That the illusion of an unbroken chain of
monarchical dominion continued to preoccupy statesmen pointed to the uni-
versal utility of invented traditions but also meant – to paraphrase the
 See Jasper Heinzen, ‘Monarchical state-building through state destruction: Hohenzollern
self-legitimization at the expense of deposed dynasties in the Kaiserreich’, German History, 
(), pp. –.
 Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren, pp. , . One of the few group portraits of mediatized and
deposed princely houses comes from the pen of the popular s writer Louise Otto-Peters,
but due to its mass appeal this publication contains little analysis or indeed comparison. Louise
Otto-Peters, Geschichte mediatisirter deutscher Fürstenhäuser Hannover, Kurhessen, Nassau, Thurn und
Taxis, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Ansbach, Baireuth und Arenberg (Leipzig,
).
 Gottwald, Fürstenrecht und Staatsrecht, p. .
 James J. Sheehan, German history, – (Oxford, ), p. . See also Peter
H. Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire: a thousand years of Europe’s history (London, );
Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire ( vols., Oxford, ); Andreas
Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth’, International
Organization,  (), pp. –.
 On the relevance of early modern composite statehood traditions for nineteenth-century
state-building, see part  in Michael Broers and Ambrogio A. Caiani, eds., A history of the
European restorations, I (London, ); William D. Godsey, The sinews of Habsburg power: Lower
Austria in a fiscal-military state, – (Oxford, ).
 Helga Schnabel-Schüle, ‘Herrschaftswechsel – zum Potential einer Forschungskategorie’,
in Helga Schnabel-Schüle and Andreas Gestrich, eds., Fremde Herrscher – fremdes Volk: Inklusions-
und Exklusionsfiguren bei Herrschaftswechseln in Europa (Frankfurt a. M., ), p. .
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philosopher Robert Pogue Harrison – that former rulers were fated to remain
undead as long as their image survived. Put another way, where monarchs
drew on the symbolic capital of their predecessors to navigate the fragmented
legacy of conquest, sovereignty functioned as a shared resource.
This article contends that the Prussian ‘monarchical principle’ masked fun-
damental insecurities about how to deal with holders of residual sovereignty.
Constitutional theorists following in the footsteps of Jean Bodin argued that if
sovereignty was indivisible, as they believed, it should be vested exclusively in
the executive branch of government headed by the crown. But how was the
case for a strong monarchy to be made by princes who sought to extend their
power at the expense of peers? The fact that many states had secured territory
through conquest during the Napoleonic Wars and at the Congress of Vienna
only steeled the determination of the surviving monarchs to defend their pos-
sessions. The Final Act of the Vienna Congress proclaimed Germany’s
crowned heads the carriers of ‘all state authority’ (gesamte Staatsgewalt) in
their domains in . At the same time, mediatized princes retained preten-
sions to independent authority in certain areas, and legitimists warned that any
unilateral dispossession of rulers’ patrimony fragmented the very idea of sover-
eignty, since each side was left in possession of some attributes. The ambiguity
which was thus introduced into the legal idea and exercise of the monarchical
principle took decades to resolve. Indeed, the Prussian crown’s negotiations
with the Standesherren lasted long enough to still be in progress by the time
the government proceeded to absorb the thrones conquered in , which
offers a final reason for why the two groups of toppled sovereigns merit study
not apart but together.
Although Germany’s federal heritage invested the question of where sover-
eignty resided with unrivalled complexity vis-à-vis more centrally governed
nations, the issues that the Hohenzollerns and their detractors grappled
with tapped into wider currents of political transformation and realignment
since the French Revolution. Just as aristocrats at large shifted their
ethos from seigneurialism to an emphasis on service to the state, so, too,
 Robert Pogue Harrison, The dominion of the dead (Chicago, IL, ), pp. –.
 Hartwin Spenkuch, ‘Vergleichsweise besonders? Politisches System und Strukturen
Preußens als Kern des “deutschen Sonderwegs”’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft,  (),
pp. –; Otto Brunner, ‘Vom Gottesgnadentum zum monarchischen Prinzip: Der Weg
der europäischen Monarchie seit dem hohen Mittelalter’, in Das Königtum: Seine geistigen und
rechtlichen Grundlagen (Lindau and Constance, ), pp. –; Otto Hintze, ‘Das mon-
archische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung’, Preußische Jahrbücher,  (),
pp. –; Eduard Hubrich, ‘Das monarchische Prinzip in Preußen’, Zeitschrift für Politik,
 (), pp. –. On Bodin’s long-term impact on German political philosophy, see
the last three chapters in Michael Philipp, ed., Debatten um die Souveränität: Jean Bodins
Staatsverständnis und seine Rezeption seit dem . Jahrhundert (Baden-Baden, ). On the mon-
archocentric set-up of the German Confederation, see Christopher Clark, ‘Germany –
: restoration or Pre-March?’, in Mary Fulbrook, ed., German history since 
(New York, NY, ), pp. –.
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monarchs – reigning or otherwise – had to justify their leadership in novel ways
that took account of society’s needs in an era of burgeoning nationalism and
proliferating constitutions. How these objectives were to be met remained a
bone of contention. In exploring the competition of the Hohenzollerns and
rival sovereigns for power, money, and legitimacy, the article foregrounds the
disorientation wrought by the nineteenth century’s territorial changes and
reconfiguration of loyalties. Within the short space of seventy years, the
region that would become the German empire evolved from a porous conglom-
erate of semi-autonomous bodies, specially defined communities, and Länder
peculiar unto themselves into a nation-state with relatively uniform boundaries,
law codes, and political institutions.
The nineteenth century’s betwixt-and-between condition is elegantly cap-
tured by the Marxist phrase of the ‘simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’.
Uneven socio-political reforms and fractures in lived experience produced
time lags in contemporaries’ adjustment to the social, political, and techno-
logical transformations unfolding around them. Read one way, the insistence
of Standesherren and exiled monarchs on entitlements and exemptions outside
the constitutional rights granted to ordinary subjects marked these individuals
as ancien régime hold-outs destined to succumb to the twin pressures of bureau-
cratic rationalization and national integration. Measured by their own stan-
dards, however, the dispossessed and their Hohenzollern competitors
negotiated discrete visions of modernity in putting forward claims to sovereign
status. For all their innate conservatism, King Georg V and Elector Friedrich
Wilhelm I had no qualms about appealing to public opinion for quasi-
plebiscitary support. Conversely, the Prussian government blended pre-
understandings of sovereignty as disposable crown property with ‘progressive’
pronouncements on national interest and the right of the German nation to
be unified.
 See William D. Godsey, Nobles and nation in central Europe: free imperial knights in the Age of
Revolution, – (Cambridge, ); Pierangelo Schiera, ‘Europäisches
Verfassungsdenken, –: Die Zentralität der Legislativgewalt zwischen monarchischem
Prinzip und Legitimität’, in Werner Daum, ed.,Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im
. Jahrhundert: Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, II (Bonn, ),
pp. –, esp. pp. –.
 On these changes, see Sheehan, German history, pp. –; William W. Hagen, German
history in modern times: four lives of the nation (Cambridge, ), parts  and ; John Breuilly,
ed., Nineteenth-century Germany: politics, culture and society (London and New York, NY, );
Helmuth W. Smith, ed., The Oxford handbook of modern German history (Oxford, ).
 Ernst Bloch, ‘Nonsynchronism and the obligation to its dialectics’,New German Critique, 
(), pp. –; Johannes Rohrbeck, ‘Rehabilitating the philosophy of history’, in Peter
Koslowski, ed., The discovery of historicity in German Idealism and Historism (Berlin, ),
pp. –, esp. pp. –; Hanns-Georg Brose, ‘Introduction: towards a culture of non-
simultaneity?’, Time and Society,  (), pp. –.
 See Ambrogio A. Caiani’s stimulating take on the limits and possibilities of the conserva-
tive imaginary in ‘Revisiting the ancien régime in post-Napoleonic Europe’, European History
Quarterly,  (), pp. –.
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To capture the protean character of sovereignty, the first part of this article
sets out the constitutional significance of the monarchical principle and the
risks emanating from enforced transfers of sovereign power. In a second step,
the Prussian government’s efforts to reach independent settlements with the
Standesherren and deposed monarchs will be discussed before concluding
with some broader reflections on monarchical state-building in Prussia. This
undertaking will centre primarily on the first half of the nineteenth century
prior to Germany’s transformation from a federation of states into a
Prussian-dominated federal state in , which curtailed – though not
eliminated – opportunities for the display of alternative forms of sovereignty.
I
An early point of orientation for debates about royal sovereignty in Prussia was
the monarchical principle. This legal fiction gained popularity in response to
the violence unleashed by the French Revolution, which pitted new visions of
popular sovereignty against older models of enlightened absolutism. The per-
sisting tension between these two sources of legitimacy made conservatives
and moderate liberals eager to eliminate all potential for further instability.
Adopting a term coined by Friedrich Schlegel in /, they agreed to recog-
nize in the king the sovereign representative of the state but concomitantly
avoided explicit statements on whether his authority derived from the will of
God or a social contract with his subjects. Even when King Friedrich
Wilhelm IV issued a constitution, the question remained subject to different
interpretations. In Michael Stolleis’s estimation, the ‘legal genius’ of the monar-
chical principle lay precisely in its ambiguity, which solved certain conflicts and
shrouded others. Indeed, from early on the pre-eminent philosopher G. W. F.
Hegel propagated the creed that Prussia’s hereditary rulers were arbiters of a
free, rationally ordered society. The conservative politician Friedrich Julius
Stahl would further expand on the purpose of the monarchical principle with
a famous treatise some three decades later. Like some members of King
Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s court, the author of Das monarchische Princip ()
recognized that the heyday of ‘absolute monarchy’ had passed. He nevertheless
 Frank Lorenz Müller, ‘The German monarchies’, in Matthew Jefferies, ed., The Ashgate
companion to Imperial Germany (Farnham, ), p. ; Richard Dietrich, ‘Foederalismus,
Unitarismus oder Hegemonialstaat?’, in Oswald Spengler, ed., Zur Problematik ‘Preußen und
das Reich’ (Cologne and Vienna, ), pp. –.
 Brunner, ‘Vom Gottesgnadentum zum monarchischen Prinzip’, p. .
 Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, II (Munich, ), p. .
 See Bernard Yack, ‘The rationality of Hegel’s concept of monarchy’, American Political
Science Review,  (), pp. –, esp. p. ; Wolfgang Reinhard, Geschichte der
Staatsgewalt: Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart
(Munich, ), pp. –; Markus J. Prutsch, ‘“Monarchical constitutionalism” in post-
Napoleonic Europe: concept and practice’, in Kelly L. Grotke and Markus J. Prutsch, eds.,
Constitutionalism, legitimacy, and power (Oxford, ), pp. –.
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wished to preserve the unitary character of sovereignty lest other branches of
government hold the executive to ransom and thereby force the monarchy to
abandon its balancing role in society. Stahl’s functionalist argument in
favour of monarchical rule went hand in hand with a desire for a symbiotic
union of church and state. Stahl’s ideal of the ‘Christian state’ played straight
to the mystical bent of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, Georg V of Hanover, and many
fellow rulers, who, to varying degrees, maintained a belief in the divine
origins of their office. Later in the century, Kaiser Wilhelm II would take
the eschatological legitimization of kingship to new extremes by styling
himself God’s medium on earth and ex officio blessed with the gift of
clairvoyance.
To be sure, the practical implementation of the monarchical principle ran
into a number of difficulties. For a start, the fear of revolution and the very
real upheavals of  deterred conservatives from insisting too hard on the
supreme will of the monarch. For all its pandering to the executive powers of
the king, for instance, the Prussian constitution of  (which remained in
force with modifications until ) broke with precedent because it did not
explicitly identify the crown as the holder of all public authority. Moreover,
Articles , , and  vested in parliament a joint right with the crown to ini-
tiate and pass legislation and to approve the governmental budget. From this
moment at the latest, it became difficult to argue that the Prussian monarch
ruled alone. Finally, the monarchical principle clashed with the burgeoning
drive for national unification. The fact that the sovereignty of the thirty-nine
members of the German Confederation was theoretically absolute excluded
the possibility of a nation-state to whom citizens owed primary allegiance. A
commentary published in  by the Göttingen historian and politician
Georg Waitz, Das Wesen des Bundesstaates, went so far as to suggest that national-
ists’ bid to bring about German unification during the  revolution had
 Friedrich Julius Stahl, Das monarchische Princip: Eine staatsrechtlich-politische Abhandlung
(Heidelberg, ); Thomas Nipperdey, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, –,
trans. Daniel Nolan (Dublin, ), pp. –; Mark Hewitson, ‘“The old forms are breaking
up,…our new Germany is rebuilding itself”: constitutionalism, nationalism and the creation of
a German polity during the revolutions of –’, English Historical Review,  (),
p. .
 David E. Barclay, Frederick William IV and the Prussian monarchy, – (Oxford,
); Dieter Brosius, ‘Georg V. von Hannover – der König des “monarchischen Prinzips”’,
Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch,  (), pp. –; Christiane Wolf, ‘Representing constitutional
monarchy in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, Germany, and Austria’, in
Laurence Cole and Daniel L. Unowsky, eds., The limits of loyalty: imperial symbolism, popular alle-
giances, and state patriotism in the late Habsburg monarchy (New York, NY, and Oxford, ),
p. .
 John C. G. Röhl, Wilhelm II (Munich, ), pp. –.
 Hans Boldt, ‘Die preußische Verfassung vom . Januar : Probleme ihrer
Interpretation’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft,  (), p. .
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been doomed to failure because monarchical and national sovereignty can-
celled each other out.
Despite these concerns, however, the monarchical principle’s emphasis on
the sovereign individuality of the king remained topical. Hermann Wagener,
the editor of the conservative flagship newspaper Die Kreuzzeitung and the
Neue Conversations-Lexikon, admonished his readers that the state was akin to a
family with a royal patriarch at its head. To remain impartial and decisive in
his actions, the father-monarch could not submit to anyone above or recognize
co-sovereign institutions beside him. By the same token, Wagener felt that
popular sovereignty, as embodied by parliament, introduced divisions into pol-
itical life, which benefited certain groups but not society in its entirety. Worse,
infighting laid a country open to foreign meddling and fuelled widespread dis-
content for would-be dictators to feed off. He therefore opined that ‘hereditary
monarchies’ were the best form of government
because everything is set up like in bourgeois familial patriarchates; the son follows
the profession of the father and takes over his dominion (Herrschaft) without giving
anyone cause to feel envy. By keeping others’ lofty ambitions in check on account of
the unattainability of the highest office for them, the hereditary monarchy alone can
fulfil the mandate of monarchy…and bring about peace for the state, in which
people will not compete with each other for power and dominion but wrestle with
opposing natural forces for happiness and moral satisfaction.
There can be no doubt that Wagener’s pronouncements reflected a particular
brand of conservatism that was fashionable at court and certain aristocratic
circles at the time, but some of his ideas tapped into wider intellectual currents.
Carl von Rotteck, an influential liberal activist in the Pre-March period, con-
curred with his political opponent that a constitutional king had the necessary
clout to offset ‘scheming courtiers’ and ‘power-hungry ministers’. In fact, it is
telling that repeated attempts between  and  to introduce legal min-
isterial responsibility in the second chamber of the Prussian Landtag failed in
part because parliamentarians accepted that impeachment would have
infringed on the king’s right to choose (and dismiss) his ministers.
 Dieter Grimm, ‘Was the German empire a sovereign state?’, in Sven Oliver Müller and
Cornelius Torp, eds., Imperial Germany revisited: continuing debates and new perspectives
(New York, NY, ), pp. –.
 Hermann Wagener, Neues Conversations-Lexikon: Staats- und Gesellschafts-Lexikon, XIII
(Berlin, ), p. . On the function and uses of political lexicons in this period, see
Hans-Christof Kraus, ‘Parlamente und Parteien in liberalen und konservativen deutschen
Staatslexika des . Jahrhunderts’, Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte,  (), pp. –.
On Wagener’s career with the Kreuzzeitung, see Dagmar Bussiek, ‘Mit Gott für König und
Vaterland!’: Die Neue Preußische Zeitung (Kreuzzeitung), – (Münster, ), pp. –.
 Karl von Rotteck, ‘Monarchie’, in Karl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor Welcker, eds.,
Staats-Lexikon oder Enzyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften, X (Altona, ), pp. –.
 Erich Hahn, ‘Ministerial responsibility and impeachment in Prussia –’, Central
European History,  (), pp. –; Marita Krauss, Herrschaftspraxis in Bayern und Preußen im
. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt a. M., ), pp. –.
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Wegener’s ruminations are pertinent for two reasons. First, they bear testa-
ment to the challenge contemporaries faced in conceptualizing Herrschaft as
plural and contested. The existence of multiple claimants, Wegener counselled,
merely exacerbated political strife. Secondly, to function effectively, a dynasty’s
hold on the throne had to be secure lest the monarchy become what it was
meant to forestall, a source of instability and factionalism. But what perhaps
stood out most about the monarchical principle was the blatant discrepancy
between its legitimism (which is to say the belief that heredity invested dynasties
with the right to rule over a particular territory in perpetuity) and the vagaries of
raison d’état, war, and great power politics. Conquest was very much part of this
matrix, as were the complex ethical and legal issues it raised.
One scholar who was not afraid to probe the contradictions of ‘state-building
through state destruction’ in the s was Friedrich Brockhaus, a young lec-
turer at the University of Jena who also happened to be the grandson of the
eponymous publisher and a nephew of Richard Wagner. In an illuminating
-page study on the pitfalls of non-consensual power grabs, he courageously
pointed out that nearly all ruling dynasties had despoiled fellow princes during
their rise to the top. He therefore asked: was the legitimacy of German mon-
archs since  inviolable, as Article  of the Final Act of the Congress of
Vienna seemed to imply, or could might be made right if victims accepted
material compensation, other states recognized the fait accompli, or subjects
approved of the regime change? Even the warlike dissolution of the German
Confederation in  and the attendant annulment of the Final Act did not
settle the issue for Brockhaus. He refused to condone the proposition that dyn-
astic ownership could be terminated by a quick flick of the pen. To his mind,
monarchical sovereignty was neither dependent on popular acclamation,
since the legitimate officer-holder could veto any decision inimical to his inter-
ests, nor could it be taken away from the crown through an act of enforced self-
destruction. To give regime change a maximum degree of legitimacy, the co-
operation of the dethroned ruler was necessary, either in the shape of voluntary
abdication or ‘tacit relinquishment’. He finished on a reassuring note for the
Prussian government, however, by insisting that subjects owed their sovereign
obedience so as not to jeopardize the integrity of the state itself. Without an
army, pretenders were simply ‘irrelevant in international law’ (völkerrechtlich
indifferent).
 On the phenomenon of dynastic ‘state-building through state destruction’, see Dieter
Langewiesche, Die Monarchie im Jahrhundert Europas: Selbstbehauptung durch Wandel im .
Jahrhundert (Heidelberg, ), p. .
 Friedrich Brockhaus, Das Legitimitätsprincip: Eine staatsrechtliche Abhandlung (Leipzig,
), pp. –. Note that Brockhaus based some of his arguments on Heinrich Zoepfl
and H. A. Zachariae, who defended the interests of the Standesherren and Georg V of Hanover.
 Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. . On this issue, see also the book review by ‘Fricker’ in the Zeitschrift für die
gesamte Staatswissenschaft,  (), pp. –.
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To put Brockhaus’s findings in perspective, better known constitutional the-
orists than him have grappled with conquest or the transfer of sovereignty in
their models of the state. Thomas Hobbes tried and arguably failed with his
theorem of ‘despotical dominion’ based on enforced consent, whose contradic-
tions have made at least one critic fear for the coherence of Leviathan. Carl
Schmitt would still concede three hundred years later in a nod to the ‘state
of exception’: ‘The methods of empty normative generalizations are indicative
in their deceptive abstractness, because they fundamentally disregard all con-
crete spatial viewpoints when considering a typical spatial problem such as ter-
ritorial change.’ The next section will delve into how the Prussian crown
responded to these ‘concrete spatial viewpoints’ in their dealings with media-
tized princes.
I I
The territorial reorganization of the former Holy Roman Empire in /
affected a sizeable number of families with varying pretensions to sovereign
status. In addition to the  or so imperial princes and counts that would
become Standesherren,  clans belonging to the lesser estate of free imperial
knights were absorbed by larger neighbouring states against their will. In
Prussia alone, the former lands of the Standesherren amounted to  square
miles and were home to , inhabitants by the s. Although their
prestige was premised on only having owed fealty to the Holy Roman Empire
prior to mediatization, the liberties, financial circumstances, and political
clout of individual standesherrlich families varied greatly across the German
Confederation. Debts resulting from diminished resources had forced some
of the minor potentates to give up their independence in all but name long
before the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, whereas others could
boast enormous wealth – such as the princes of Thurn and Taxis – and ties to
Europe’s premier royal dynasties like the princes of Leiningen.
 Thomas Hobbes, ‘Of dominion paternal, and despotical’, in J. C. A. Gaskin, ed., Leviathan
(Oxford, ), pp. –; Charles D. Tarlton, ‘“To avoid the present stroke of death”: des-
potical dominion, force, and legitimacy in Hobbes’s Leviathan’, Philosophy,  (), p. .
 Carl Schmitt, The nomos of the earth in the international law of the jus publicum europaeum,
trans. G. L. Ulmen (New York, NY, ), p. .
 For slightly lower estimates, see Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren, p. ; and Vahlteich, Die
deutschen Standesherren, pp. –.
 Carl Heiner Beusch, ‘Westfälische Standesherren: Die Fürsten von Bentheim-
Tecklenburg im . Jahrhundert’, Westfälische Zeitschrift,  (), p. .
 Frank Kleinehagenbrock, ‘Alte Rechte in neuen Staaten? Reichsrecht, Bundesrecht und
die Standesherren im Süden und Nordwesten Deutschlands’, in Matthias Asche, Thomas
Nicklas, and Matthias Stickler, eds., Was vom Alten Reiche blieb…Deutungen, Institutionen und
Bilder des frühneuzeitlichen Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation im . und . Jahrhundert
(Munich, ), p. ; Eva-Carolina Doll, Handlungsstrukturen: Die Standesherrschaft Thurn
und Taxis in der Epochenschwelle zum . Jahrhundert unter Fürst Maximilian Karl (Regensburg,
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Standesherrenmay have constituted a heterogeneous group, but they neverthe-
less exhibited common traits which delineated them from the lower nobility.
For one, their continuing dynastic equality with ruling families held out the pos-
sibility – at least in theory – of their return to power either through marriage or
election to foreign thrones. The British government’s brief nomination of
Prince Ernst Leopold von Leiningen for the Greek crown in  demon-
strated the potential of their privileged position. Another similarity in lifestyle
mediatized shared with ruling princes were their cosmopolitan family networks.
They often possessed estates in several states and made a habit of cultivating loy-
alties to more than one nation, as the example of the Anglo-Dutch-German
Bentincks and the ancient Franco-Belgian-German House of Croÿ bears
out. Some Standesherren like the princes of Hohenlohe and Wied even
became part of the rarefied social circles that connected European royalty.
The Federal Act of  was responsive enough to these unique circumstances
to permit Standesherren to choose their abode freely within the German
Confederation and to enter the service of foreign nations. Other privileges
included exemption from direct taxation and military service, and the right
to be judged by a jury of their own peers in criminal legal proceedings.
Provisions for the management of their family estates carried the force of law
and hereditary seats in state parliaments offered them the opportunity to
influence law-making at state level. In Prussia, mediatized princes furthermore
retained their church advowson, supervision over schools, and the right to
appoint legal magistrates. True, the land-owning lower aristocracy, the
Junkers, held on to many of the same patrimonial powers into the s,
making each estate a formidable ‘private law state’. Yet the superior status
); Monika Wienfort, ‘Adlige Handlungsspielräume und neue Adelstypen in der “klas-
sischen Moderne” (–)’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft,  (), pp. –.
 Queen Victoria to Lord Russell,  Feb. , in George Earle Buckle, ed., The letters of
Queen Victoria, second series, I (London, ), p. .
 On these cosmopolitan dynastic connections, see Spangler, ‘Those in between’; William
D. Godsey and Veronika Hyden-Hanscho, eds., Das Haus Arenberg und die Habsburgermonarchie:
Eine transterritoriale Adelsfamilie zwischen Fürstendienst und Eigenständigkeit (.–. Jahrhundert)
(Regensburg, ); Marie zu Erbach-Schönberg, Aus stiller und bewegter Zeit: Erinnerungen
aus meinem Leben (Darmstadt, ), pp. –.
 James Pope-Hennessy, Queen Mary: the official biography (London, ; orig. edn ),
pp. –.
 Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren, p. .
 Note that the powers of the Junkers were tied to ownership of a particular type of estate, the
Rittergut, rather than inherited family privileges like mediatized princes. By , only  per
cent of the Rittergütter in Prussia’s eastern provinces remained in noble hands, with the result
that a growing number of commoners were assuming patrimonial lordship. Shearer Davis
Bowman, ‘Antebellum planters and Vormärz Junkers in comparative perspective’, American
Historical Review,  (), pp. , ; John R. Gillis, ‘Aristocracy and bureaucracy in nine-
teenth-century Prussia’, Past & Present,  (), p. . See also Robert M. Berdahl, The pol-
itics of the Prussian nobility: the development of a conservative ideology, – (Princeton, NJ,
); Heinz Reif, Adel, Aristokratie, Elite: Sozialgeschichte von Oben (Berlin, ), pp. –;
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of the Standesherren was underlined by royal decrees issued in  and ,
which entitled them to be included alongside the king in church prayers, to
be addressed by their former titles, and to employ guards of honour, if they
so wished. In light of these wide-ranging privileges, legal historians have
suggested that until the  revolution mediatized princes performed the
functions of Unterlandesherren. The term resembles the mechanisms of
‘quasi-sovereignty’ that Benton sees at work in European empires, where the
erasure of local ruler’s effective sovereignty did not clear away conflict at the
grassroots over the actual exercise of jurisdiction.
Many mediatized princes were determined to defend their quasi-sovereign
position. In , they formed their own pressure group, the Association of
the Mediatized, and during the deliberations about their future at the
Congress of Vienna two years later, Count Friedrich zu Solms-Laubach wrote
to his clansman Prince Friedrich zu Solms-Braunfels: ‘We do not want to
become subjects but rather peers-cum-clients (Schutzverwandte) [of the larger
monarchies]; we would feel discomfited if our subjects were simply treated as
numbers and the principle was thereby established that we and our people
could be put on scales like bones and butchers’ meat.’ Schutzverwandter was
a telling choice of word, for it resurrected an early modern descriptor for indi-
viduals who enjoyed the protection of a polity without fully belonging to it.
Although mediatized princes in Prussia had no choice but to accept
the suzerainty of the Hohenzollerns after , they continued to display
‘quasi-sovereign’ leadership in philanthropy for decades to come. Prince Otto
zu Salm-Horstmar made a name for himself as founder-patron of the
University of Münster, and on a more modest scale, his peers founded
schools and supported causes ranging from art to historical associations. They
also assumed the protectorate over various charities and patriotic organizations,
while female members of mediatized families were known to provide resources
for nursing and poor relief. In short, ‘the [former] high nobility of the Holy
Roman Empire saw itself in a very Hobbesian sense as the representatives of
their subjects’ rights and general well-being’, as one historian has put it.
Jens Neumann, ‘Der Adel im . Jahrhundert in Deutschland und England im Vergleich’,
Geschichte und Gesellschaft,  (), pp. –.
 Benton, A search for sovereignty, p. ; Gottwald, Fürsten und Staatsrecht, pp. –.
 Count Solm-Laubach cited by Arthur Kleinschmidt,Geschichte von Arenberg, Salm und Leyen,
– (Gotha, ), pp. –.
 See the entry for ‘Schutz-Verwandte, Schutz-Genosse, Schirm-Verwandte oder Schirm-
Genosse, Schutzleute’, in Johann Heinrich Zedler, Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller
Wissenschaften und Künste, XXXV (Leipzig, ), columns –.
 Hansjoachim Henning, ‘“Noblesse oblige?” Fragen zum ehrenamtlichen Engagement
des deutschen Adels, –’, Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 
(), pp. –.
 Frank Jung, ‘Mediatisierung, Konstitutionalisierung und Parlamentarisierung: Die
Selbstintegration hessischer Standesherren zwischen Alten Reich und Norddeutschem
Reichstag’, Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte,  (), pp. –.
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Small wonder, then, that decision-makers in Berlin were not opposed to a
modicum of standesherrlich autonomy. The digestion of Prussia’s territorial
gains from the Napoleonic Wars (above all on the Rhine, where most of the
mediatized princes’ estates lay) was a cumbersome task, and rather than
impose laws and institutions from the East Elbian provinces, the central govern-
ment preferred to leave decisions about local matters in the hands of those most
directly affected. To that end, consultative bodies for each province
(Provinziallandtage) were established in . The state ministry hoped that it
could rely on the Standesherren to aid the bureaucratic penetration of society,
if properly co-opted. The crown prince, the future Friedrich Wilhelm IV,
showed particular respect for an institution with deep historical roots in the
community. At a meeting of the state ministry in February , he rejected
a proposal to curb subjects’ oath of allegiance to their Standesherren because
he considered this estate a valuable pillar of ‘Germany’s feudal constitution’.
He thus took it badly when the Frankfurt parliament abolished the majority of
mediatized princes’ seigneurial rights ten years later. Once the dust of the
/ revolution had settled, he lobbied for restitution by reminding his min-
isters that he was a ‘monarch who, thanks to a series of unfortunate events, has
come to enjoy the fruits of an egregious theft from his [former] peers in the
Holy Roman Empire’. Previously, the victims of the ‘egregious theft’ had sub-
mitted a petition to the new national parliament in Frankfurt on  July , in
which they pilloried this injustice before going on to claim that even though
financial settlements had remedied some of their grievances, the autonomy
to govern their entailed estates and adopt binding constitutions for their dynas-
ties could never be taken away from them. These rights were beyond the reach
of ‘state sovereignty’. Although the petitioners were implicitly conflating the
legal person of the monarch and the state, which even royal ministers rejected,
their spirited defence of the dynastic equality of mediatized and ruling houses
naturally struck a chord with Friedrich Wilhelm IV. The upshot of the king’s
sympathy was once again the perpetuation of jurisdictional pluralism: on the
one hand Prime Minister Otto von Manteuffel enacted reforms to replace the
manorial courts of large landowners with regular ones throughout the s,
 Protocol of the Ministry of State meeting on  Feb. , in Christina Rathgeber, ed., Die
Protokolle des Preußischen Staatsministeriums (Hildesheim, ), p. .
 Friedrich Wilhelm IV cited in Rolf Schier, Standesherren: Zur Auflösung der Adelsherrschaft in
Deutschland, – (Heidelberg and Karlsruhe, ), p. .
 Wolfram Siemann, / in Deutschland und Europa: Ereignis – Bewältigung –
Erinnerung (Paderborn, ), pp. –.
 As Bismarck would go on to acknowledge when he became Prussian prime minister, the
individuality of the state ‘interpose[d] itself between the prince and the people’. Winfried
Ranke, ‘Preußen – ein Kunststück’, in Gottfried Korff, ed., Preußen: Versuch einer Bilanz
(Reinbek, ), p. .
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but at the same time, the king restored mediatized princes to their privileged
legal status and exemption from personal and property taxes.
Incongruous as the existence of parallel jurisdictions may have seemed from a
legal standpoint, Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s solidarity with the Standesherren did
serve a higher political purpose. Since Europe’s crowned heads sought to recon-
solidate their hold on power after the territorial reorganizations of the
Napoleonic Wars less by resurrecting rights that had supposedly been lost
and more by convincing the public of their unbroken historic entitlements,
as Volker Sellin notes, it would have undermined Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s cred-
ibility in his own eyes to deny the same courtesy to mediatized princes. He was
committed to what David Barclay has called his ‘monarchical project’, which
endeavoured to forge a sacral cult of monarchy supported by corporations
like the Standesherren. This return to a ‘new ancien régime’ chimed with the
time-honoured identification of sovereignty with local jurisdiction in German
politico-legal thought. For example, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, a leading rep-
resentative of the Historical School in the Pre-March era, believed that
gradual change based on indigenous common law was preferable to the uncer-
tainties of rapid reform in the French Revolutionary style. Any attempt to
assert a ‘higher power randomly and capriciously in disregard of the rights of
others – be they chieftains, aristocrats or the masses’ ran the risk of being con-
sidered despotic, Savigny’s former pupil, Bluntschli, warned. Fears about
French-style ‘monocracy’ were well established in the German lands since the
period of French occupation. Even defenders of Roman Law could agree
that a system premised on custom and the ancient corporate estates was more
in tune with central Europe’s rich heritage of self-governing traditions.
Of course, the integration of mediatized princes into the bureaucratic struc-
ture of the Prussian state was not free from friction. A notable bone of conten-
tion were the expectations of each party. The hope of some mediatized princes
to retain their own administrations sat awkwardly with the role Berlin envisaged
for them, which approximated the minor merum imperium of the Bodinian con-
stitutional tradition as holders of limited executive powers delegated by the
 Anna Ross, Beyond the barricades: government and state-building in post-revolutionary Prussia,
– (Oxford, ), p. ; Beusch, ‘Westfälische Standesherren’, p. .
 Volker Sellin, Das Jahrhundert der Restaurationen:  bis  (Munich, ),
introduction.
 Barclay, Frederick William IV and the Prussian monarchy, p. viii.
 Margaret Barber Crosby, The making of a German constitution: a slow revolution (Oxford,
), p. . The term ‘new ancien régime’ has been borrowed from Caiani, ‘Revisiting the
ancien régime in post-Napoleonic Europe’, p. .
 Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch, II (Stuttgart, ), p. ; Robert
Bernsee, Moralische Erneuerung: Korruption und bürokratische Reformen in Bayern und Preußen,
– (Göttingen, ), p. .
 Crosby, The making of a German constitution, pp. –; James Q. Whitman, The legacy of
Roman Law in the German Romantic Era: historical vision and legal change (Princeton, NJ, ).
S T A T E ‐ B U I L D I N G A N D CONQU E S T
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X20000333
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.21.52.57, on 29 Jun 2021 at 13:27:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
supreme sovereign, the king of Prussia. The ensuing negotiations often lasted
for decades and necessitated compromises on both sides. Take the princes of
Bentheim-Tecklenburg. In , the crown and the Westphalian standesherrlich
family reached an accord (Rezeß) whereby Prince Emil Friedrich recognized
Prussian suzerainty and agreed to renounce all sovereign rights above and
beyond the privileges granted in  and . By way of compensation, he
received an annual pension of , thalers on top of authorization to
collect direct taxes for the upkeep of local magistrates and his own ‘governing
council’. In a second accord signed three years later, the prince gave up his
right to collect taxes and his exemption from property tax in exchange for a
further pension, yet the courts in Rheda and Limburg continued to dispense
justice in his name. What is more, his successors clung to their dormant right
to collect taxes. The Bentheim-Tecklenburgs were no exception. In the
mid-s, the princes of Wied and Solms-Braunfels concluded treaties of
their own to set up standesherrlich administrations, which likewise exercised jur-
isdiction in local affairs without reference to Prussia, even if de facto they did so
on behalf of the crown. It was only due to the significant expense of maintaining
their own governments that mediatized princes – including the houses of Wied
and Solms-Braunfels – could in subsequent years be persuaded to ‘sell’ their
extant sovereign rights.
Once again it pays to emphasize, though, that the quest for sovereignty was
not a zero-sum game. On the contrary, the expansion of the Prussian state in
successive waves of reform and conquest created opportunities for enterprising
Standesherren to promote their dynastic interests while also serving the
Hohenzollern monarchy. The remarkably similar career trajectories of the
aforementioned Count Friedrich zu Solms-Laubach (–) and Count
Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode (–) showcase these hybrid allegiances
well. Both grandees first rose to prominence as advocates for the rights of
their estate. Hailing from a large clan that claimed consanguinity with the
house of Nassau and the Salic kings of the middle ages, Solms-Laubach suc-
ceeded to the presidency of the Association of the Mediatized in  as a
firm opponent of the ‘Rheinbund usurpations’ that had cost him and his
peers their independence. Thanks to his friendship with fellow
Rhinelander, imperial baron and Prussian statesman Karl vom Stein, he
 Julian H. Franklin, ‘Introduction’, in Jean Bodin, On sovereignty, ed. Julian H. Franklin
(Cambridge, ), pp. xiv–xv.
 Beusch, ‘Westfälische Standesherren’, pp. –.
 Frank Jung, ‘Landesherren und Standesherren: Adel und Staat im . und .
Jahrhundert’, in Eckart Conze, Alexander Jendorff, and Heide Wunder, eds., Adel in Hessen:
Herrschaft, Selbstverständnis und Lebensführung (Marburg, ), pp. –.
 Barbara C. Anderson, ‘State-building and bureaucracy in early nineteenth-century
Nassau’, Central European History,  (), p. ; J. C. Schaum, Das Grafen-und Fürstenhaus
Solms ist gleichzeitig mit dem Hause Nassau aus Salischem Königs-Stamme erblüht und dessen ältester
Stammsitz Braunfels (Frankfurt a. M., ).
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managed to secure a seat on the Allied Central Administrative Department
(/), in which capacity he was responsible for assessing the debt the
duchy of Nassau owed the Allied war effort against Napoleon. Not one to
miss a chance for revenge on a monarch involved in the despoilment of his
family earlier, Solms-Laubach returned with a figure the Nassowian government
considered crippling, and vowed to ‘hound’ the minor German princes until
their ‘hairs will stand on end’. Although he was ultimately unsuccessful at
reversing the subjection of mediatized prerogatives to the regulatory power of
the Nassowian state, he became a trusted adviser to Prussian chancellor
Prince Karl August von Hardenberg at the Congress of Vienna. Due to these
connections but equally his standesherrlich pedigree, the former imperial
count had himself appointed the first governor (Oberpräsident) of the new prov-
ince of Jülich-Cleve-Berg in . Since Solms-Laubach shared Stein’s belief
in the need for political reform at the local level, he consistently supported
greater autonomy for the Rhineland, favoured the recruitment of locals for
civil service positions, and lobbied for the consultation of the population to
keep Berlin abreast of regional issues.
Although Stolberg-Wernigerode’s family had ceded most of their sovereignty
to the Prussian crown long before Napoleonic Wars, he, too, took great pride in
the obligations of his heritage. The lowest courts (Friedensgerichte) and
Protestant consistory in the county of Wernigerode acted on his behalf.
Despite being subordinate to the Supreme Church Council in Berlin from
 onwards, it was understood that the superintendent of the consistory
was a comital rather than Prussian office holder. Royal decrees relating to spir-
itual matters only took effect in the county once the consistory had announced
them separately to the population. Hence, the exercise of sub-sovereignty in
Wernigerode was no sinecure. The later Prussian culture minister Robert Bosse,
who started out in the service of another branch of the family, recorded his
master’s high esteem for young Count Otto, ‘from whom the entire house of
Stolberg expects great things for the defence of their rights and reputation’.
 Anderson, ‘State-building and bureaucracy’, p. ; Wolfgang Merger, ‘Das Problem der
landständischen Verfassungen auf dem Wiener Kongress, /’, Historische Zeitschrift,
 (), pp. –.
 August Klein, Friedrich Graf zu Solms-Laubach: Preußischer Oberpräsident in Köln (–)
(Cologne, ), p. .
 Michael Rowe, From Reich to state: the Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, –
(Cambridge, ), pp. –; Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Businessmen and politics in the
Rhineland, – (Princeton, NJ, ), p. ; Horst Lademacher, ‘Die nördlichen
Rheinlande von der Rheinprovinz bis zur Bildung des Landschaftsverbandes Rheinland
(–)’, in Franz Petri and Georg Droege, eds., Rheinische Geschichte, II (Düsseldorf,
), pp. –.
 Hans Seehase, ‘Die Eingliederung von Standesherrschaften in das Königreich Preußen:
Die Stolberger Grafschaften Stolberg-Stolberg, Stolberg-Roßla und Stolberg Wernigerode’, in
Manfred Wilde and Manfred Seehase, eds., Unter neuer Herrschaft: Konsequenzen des Wiener
Kongresses (Leipzig, ), pp. –.
 Robert Bosse, ‘Fürst Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode’, Deutsche Revue,  (), p. .
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Following the completion of a law degree and a two-year stint in the Prussian
Gardes du corps, the count returned home to manage the family estates until
the Austro-Prussian War, which saw him assume senior roles in wartime philan-
thropy for the care of the wounded and sick. Despite his relative lack of experi-
ence in public administration, Bismarck next chose him to be the first Prussian
governor of the annexed kingdom of Hanover (–). A great uncle, Count
Anton zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, had served the Prussian state in the same role
at the helm of the province of Saxony thirty years before, and a cousin would
become governor of Silesia shortly after Otto’s appointment. Mindful of this
family background, the minister-president calculated that the new
Hanoverian governor’s lineage and the fact that he owned extensive property
in the province would endear him to local aristocrats mourning the loss of
the royal court. Although Guelph aristocrats proved rather harder to please
than anticipated and formed the backbone of the anti-Prussian German
Hanoverian Party into the twentieth century, Stolberg-Wernigerode pleased
middle-class liberals by championing what Heide Barmeyer has called a
‘liberal reform of the administration of state’, which coincided with
Bismarck’s overall plan to devolve responsibility for certain social welfare and
public works projects to the provinces.
Solms-Laubach’s and Stolberg-Wernigerode’s self-assured mediation
between the interests of the state and the provinces made them a particular
type of proconsul. Neither man owed his position to meritocratic advancement
through the Prussian civil service and they both poured scorn on the myopia of
bureaucrats that came to the western provinces with notions of East Elbian
superiority. Their primary legitimation came from their close relationship
with Prussia’s leading statesmen, with whom they corresponded directly and
whose policy directives they were expected to implement against local hostility.
In that sense, they conformed to the prototype of the colonial viceroy described
by Jürgen Osterhammel: ‘a specifically empowered personal envoy of the ruler,
communicating with the monarch on a more intimate footing than the ordinary
governor’, whose vice-regal mandate is tied to ‘special tasks of imperial crisis
management’ rather than authority ‘delegated on a regular and institutional
basis’. In , Solms-Laubach led a fronde of governors who refused to
submit to the ‘censorship’ of ministerial civil servants because they insisted
 Stewart A. Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph problem, –: a study in particularist oppos-
ition to national unity (The Hague, ), p. .
 Heide Barmeyer, ‘Liberale Verwaltungsreform als Mittel zur Eingliederung Hannovers in
Preußen, –/’, in Peter Baumgart, ed., Expansion und Integration: Zur
Eingliederung neugewonnener Gebiete in den preußischen Staat (Cologne and Vienna, ),
pp. –. See also Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph problem, pp. –.
 Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘The imperial viceroy: reflections on a historical type’, in Jeroen
Duidam and Sabine Dabringhaus, eds., The dynastic centre and the provinces: agents and interactions
(Leiden, ), p. .
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they were ‘envoys of the crown’ in the provinces. According to Rüdiger
Schütz, governors’ emergence as a ‘constitutional opposition’ within the
Prussian civil service reflected an ambition to regulate, administer, and
decide provincial matters locally in consultation with the highest authorities
in the land, the king and his ministers. Prussia’s successive territorial gains in
the nineteenth century helped consolidate the autonomy of the governors,
since growing diversity of the Hohenzollern state incentivized solutions that
responded to Germany’s federal heritage. This trend reached its apogee in
Stolberg-Wernigerode’s time with the County Ordnance (Kreisordnung) of
, the Provincial Ordnance (Provinzialordnung) of  and the Law on
General State Administration (Gesetz über die allgemeine Landesverwaltung) of
.
Solms-Laubach and Stolberg-Wernigerode participated prominently in the
devolution of power out of a belief that their standesherrlich origins made
them well suited for the role of broker. The latter was quick to clarify in his
memoirs that even though Prussia was his fatherland, he was no ‘Prussian
bigot or particularist’ because of his family’s wider roots in the history of the
Holy Roman Empire. His biographer, Bosse, implied in a similar vein that
the count’s amicable treaty agreements with the Hohenzollern crown about
the extant rights of his clan stemmed from a voluntary choice to serve
Prussia. This co-operation was conditional, and Stolberg-Wernigerode there-
fore did not hesitate to fight back when he perceived his dynastic interests to
be under threat. Two years after the Austro-Prussian War and in the middle
of treaty negotiations with Prussia, a senior official in his comital government,
Rudolph Elvers, published a philippic against the ‘smothering’ of political,
legal, and cultural diversity by ‘ruthless centralization and uniformity’ in the
name of state-building. Stolberg-Wernigerode’s schizophrenic relations with
Prussia are perhaps best summed up by the fact that while he held the governor-
ship of Hanover, he also litigated against his employer to determine ownership
of the Hanoverian county (Amt) of Elbingerode, which he laid claim to in his
capacity as mediatized prince. The revision of the Prussian county structure
 Rüdiger Schütz, ‘Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten, –’, in Die preußischen
Oberpräsidenten, – (Boppard a. R., ), p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Georg-Christoph von Unruh, ‘Der preußische Oberpräsident – Entstehung, Stellung und
Wandel’, in ibid., pp. –; Julian Wright and Christopher Clark, ‘Regionalism and the state in
France and Prussia’, European Review of History – Revue européenne d’histoire,  (), pp. –
.
 Otto zu Stolberg Wernigerode, Die Lebenserinnerungen des Fürsten Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode
(–), ed. Konrad Breitenborn (Wernigerode, ), p. .
 Bosse, ‘Fürst Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode’, p. .
 Rudolph Elvers, Die Stellung der deutschen Standesherren seit : Nach den Forderungen des
Rechts und der Politik (Berlin, ), pp. , . On the authorship of this anonymously published
work, see Heinrich Heffter, Otto Fürst zu Stolberg-Wernigerode (Husum, ), p. .
 Ibid., p. .
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precipitated the absorption of his comital government into the Prussian state in
, but Stolberg-Wernigerode’s career was far from over, for he was
appointed vice-chancellor of Germany and vice-premier of Prussia only two
years later.
The complex and drawn-out negotiations with mediatized princes taught the
Prussian crown lessons it could apply to the second category of dynasts under
consideration, the monarchs deposed in . Ironically, some of the same
families that had profited from the Standesherren’s fall from power earlier
would now find themselves on the receiving end.
I I I
The post-Napoleonic era was a period of intense state-building across the
German Confederation. Governments aimed to mould the disparate popula-
tions that constituted the newly minted kingdoms of Bavaria or Hanover into
integrated political communities. Their measure of success became the
degree to which these semi-artificial entities managed to reinvent themselves
as homelands of ‘nations’ or ‘tribes’ flourishing under the benign rule of
‘ancestral’ dynasties. Although the sprawling Hohenzollern monarchy lent
itself less easily to the propagation of a tribal identities, here, too, Edmund
Burke’s reflections on the negative lessons of the French Revolution inspired
Romantic intellectuals like the political economist Adam Müller to initiate a
shift away from instrumental towards organic interpretations of the state,
which found its guardian and spiritual embodiment in the monarch. The
fusion of patriotism and dynasticism in such narratives of mutual attachment
between the sovereign and his subjects bears testament to the growing import-
ance of ‘soft power’ in the projection of royal authority. In addition to trad-
itional pillars of the monarchical principle like the ability to wield command
over the army or the state bureaucracy, the rise of the mass media, the steady
expansion of railway networks and consumer culture enabled monarchs to com-
municate with subjects more directly than ever before in pursuit of
Untertanenliebe (love of subjects for their sovereign).
 Frank Lorenz Müller, Royal heirs in Imperial Germany: the future of monarchy in nineteenth-
century Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg (Basingstoke, ), ch. ; Abigail Green, Fatherlands:
state-building and nationhood in nineteenth-century Germany (Cambridge, ); Simone Mergen,
Monarchiejubiläen im . Jahrhundert: Die Entdeckung des historischen Jubiläums für den monarchischen
Kult in Sachsen und Bayern (Leipzig, ), p. .
 Duncan Kelly, ‘Revisiting the rights of man: Georg Jellinek on rights and the state’, Law
and History Review,  (), p. ; Adam Müller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst, ed. Jakob Baxa,
II (Jena, ; orig. edn ), esp. pp. –.
 See Frank Lorenz Müller, ‘“Winning their trust and affection”: royal heirs and the uses of
soft power in nineteenth-century Europe’, in Frank Lorenz Müller and Heidi Mehrkens, eds.,
Royal heirs and the uses of soft power in nineteenth-century Europe (Basingstoke, ), p. . On the
meaning of Untertanenliebe and the material culture of monarchy, see also Hubertus Büschel,
Untertanenliebe: Der Kult um deutsche Monarchen, – (Göttingen, ), and Eva Giloi,
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After five decades of particularist state-building, Prussia’s annexation of
Hanover, Hessen-Kassel, and Nassau made it all the harder to settle the old
debate whether and, if so, how allegiances could be transferred in the aftermath
of regime change by force. Since the Final Act of the Vienna Congress guaran-
teed the territorial integrity of the German Confederation’s member states,
Berlin faced the risk of foreign intervention on behalf of the wronged mon-
archs. Banking on this possibility, King Georg V of Hanover issued a protest
note to all powers ‘who have recognized the sovereignty and independence
of our kingdom, convinced that they will never let might prevail over right’.
The missive asserted the king’s continued sovereignty and declared all orders
issued by the Hohenzollern ‘usurper’ void. The Prussian authorities were
well aware of the moral predicament Georg V’s obstinacy placed his subjects
in. In a revealing letter – one of many received in the first year of Prussian
rule – the mayor of Norden in East Frisia defended himself to a superior thus:
Your Excellency knows better than me that loyalty and love of country are not to be
found where people change kings like coats. Those Hanoverians that remained
faithful to King Georg V when his star began to wane will on the grounds of the
same ethical necessity be hailed as the best Prussians one day.
Mayor Johann Hillern Taaks of Norden was one of the many civil servants and
officers in the occupied territories that were waiting to be released from the
oath of allegiance to their former sovereigns. Friedrich Wilhelm I of Hessen-
Kassel and Adolph of Nassau issued the necessary instructions soon after the
annexations became formalized, as did Georg V with some delay in
December . Defiance would have achieved little except to endanger the
careers of their subordinates and to jeopardize the return of family assets
seized by Prussia. They were handsomely compensated for their sacrifice,
however. The Treaty of Stettin guaranteed the elector the continued payment
of his civil list to the value of , thalers annually (minus deductions for
administrative expenses) while Duke Adolph and Georg V received the
dividends of . and  million thalers respectively invested in Prussian
. per cent stocks and securities. In addition, the three former rulers had
estates and palaces returned to them. These generous terms provided for a
comfortable existence in exile, which permitted Duke Adolph, hitherto the
Monarchy, myth, and material culture in Germany, – (Cambridge, ). For a critical
examination of the methodological pitfalls that historians encounter when measuring the
impact of Untertanenliebe from the bottom up, see Torsten Riotte, ‘Nach “Pomp und Politik”:
Neue Ansätze in der Historiographie zum regierenden Hochadel im . Jahrhundert’, Neue
Politische Literatur,  (), pp. –.
 Georg V, Der Protest des Königs von Hannover gerichtet an die europäischen Mächte gegen die
Einverleibung seines Landes durch den König von Preußen (n.p., ), pp. –.
 Mayor Taaks to Civil Commissioner Freiherr Hans von Hardenberg,  Aug. ,
Niedersächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (hereafter NHStAH) Hann.  Nr /I.
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ruler over less than half a million subjects, to maintain a household of  court
officials and servants.
At first glance, the deposed monarchs’ trade of sovereign rights for money
conformed to the path chosen by many Standesherren. Indeed, this is how
Queen Victoria, who had initiated the negotiations with the Prussian govern-
ment on Georg V’s behalf, interpreted the agreement when she assured
Bismarck that the king’s acceptance of money from Berlin would make him
honour-bound not to interfere in Hanover. Wilhelm of Prussia’s senior advi-
sers made much the same point in their recommendation to approve the treaty.
The fact that the exchange of subjects for cash flew in the face of the supposedly
unique congruity between dynastic, ethno-tribal, and territorial identities so
cherished by state-builders raised few hackles because the reduction of sover-
eignty to an alienable commodity allowed for easier transfer. Hence, no
sooner had Elector Friedrich Wilhelm I put his name to the Stettin Treaty
than Wilhelm ‘gifted’ the forest of Schmalkalden – until then an exclave of
Hessen-Kassel – to the duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha for his military assistance
during the war of . Friedrich Wilhelm I and Georg V were not too per-
turbed, though, since they considered the release of their subjects from the
oath of allegiance merely a temporary setback. Without the hard power of
the state behind them, they counted on the conscience of their subjects to
leave the door open for a comeback. In a public statement, the elector lectured
the population of Hessen-Kassel that although oath-takers were henceforth free
to follow the Prussian king’s command, the ‘special relationship’ that bound
them to their former sovereign was permanent. Every servant of the state there-
fore had to decide for himself whether to commit an act of ‘disloyalty’
(Treuverletzung). Georg V adopted a similar logic by asking his officers to
request their release from the oath of allegiance individually. He hoped their
personal bond could be reactivated once popular acclamation or foreign inter-
vention had put him back on the ancestral throne.
 Pierre Even, ‘Adolph, Herzog zu Nassau, Großherzog von Luxemburg: Ein Lebensbild’,
in Hessische Landesbibliothek Wiesbaden, ed., Adolph Herzog zu Nassau Großherzog von
Luxemburg, – (Wiesbaden, ), p. .
 Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph problem, p. .
 Donation reprinted in Wilhelm Hopf, ed., Die deutsche Krisis des Jahres  (Hanover,
), p. ; Max Endres, Handbuch der Forstpolitik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der
Gesetzgebung und Statistik (nd edn, Berlin, ), pp. –. On the idea of sovereignty as
royal property (which fell into increasing abeyance in the course of the nineteenth century),
see Herbert H. Rowen, The king’s state: proprietary dynasticism in early modern France (New
Brunswick, ); Rafe Blaufarb, The great demarcation: the French Revolution and the invention
of modern property (Oxford, ); Karl Möckl, ‘Der deutsche Adel und die fürstlich-monarch-
ischen Höfe, –’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft,  (), p. .
 Friedrich Wilhelm I von Hessen-Kassel, Denkschrift Sr. Königlichen Hoheit des Kurfürsten
Friedrich Wilhelm I. Von Hessen, betreffend die Auflösung des Deutschen Bundes und die Usurpation
des Kurfürstenthums durch die Krone Preußens im Jahre  (Prague, ), pp. –.
 Georg V’s adjutant general, Colonel Georg Dammers, describes in his memoirs how
officers dealt with this challenge: ‘When the time came to take my leave I was naturally very
 J A S P E R H E I N Z E N
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There existed international precedents for such conceptions of loyalty. The
Hanoverian and Hessian monarchs’ voluntarist interpretation of the subject–
sovereign dyad converged in some important respects with the discourse of sub-
jecthood in the British empire prior to the American Revolution. Growing out
of the Bodinian credo that citizenship entailed the ‘submission and obedience
of a free subject to his prince’, it established a deeply personal relationship to
the monarch as individuals across Britain’s far-flung colonies proclaimed
their allegiance to the crown and laid claim to a corresponding set of protec-
tions. A not entirely dissimilar process of claims-making underlay subject-
hood in mid-nineteenth-century Germany. Although monarchs in exile no
longer had the wherewithal to intervene on behalf of subjects openly, their
informal influence with loyal followers, donations to charities in the ‘home-
land’, and, in the case of Georg V, patronage of anti-Prussian organizations
such as the infamous Guelph Legion in France or the German Hanoverian
party were designed to convince legitimists that they were fighting the good
fight for the independence of their people. The Hohenzollerns therefore
remained concerned for a long time about individuals like the Standesherr
Prince Ludwig Wilhelm zu Bentheim, who outwardly accepted the new
regime to continue their military or civil service careers but secretly professed
a personal attachment to Georg V, the ‘king of his heart’. Put another way,
the annexations of  made the absent sovereign not only a political point
of orientation for critics of the Prussian state but also forced supporters of
Hohenzollern rule to adjust their way of thinking, even if only to discredit the
former.
moved and assured [the king] of my lasting loyalty. I told him I was saying goodbye with the
deepest sorrow but understood entirely that he did not need my services at present. Should
they be required again in future, I would be at his disposal.’ Georg F. Dammers,
Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse des königlich hannoverschen General-Major Georg Friedrich Ferdinand
Dammers, letztem General-Adjutanten des Königs Georg V. von Hannover (Hanover, ), p. .
On the oath of allegiance and the political instrumentalization of loyalty more generally, see
Bernsee, Moralische Erneuerung, pp. –; Nikolaus Buschmann and Karl Borromäus Murr,
eds., Treue: Politische Loyalität und militärische Gefolgschaft in der Moderne (Göttingen, );
Sven Lange, Der Fahneneid: Die Geschichte der Schwurverpflichtung im deutschen Militär (Bremen,
).
 HannahWeiss Muller, Subjects and sovereign: bonds of belonging in the eighteenth-century British
empire (Oxford, ), pp. , –.
 Ludwig Prince von Bentheim to King George V,  Mar. , NHStAH, Dep. , V,
.
 Riotte, Der Monarch im Exil. See also Frank Bösch, ‘A margin at the center: the conserva-
tives in Lower Saxony between Kaiserreich and Federal Republic’, in Neil Gregor, Nils Roemer,
and Mark Roseman, eds., German history from the margins (Bloomington, IN, ), pp. –;
Ernst Schubert, ‘Verdeckte Opposition in der Provinz Hannover: Der Kampf der “Welfen” um
die regionale Identität während des Kaiserreichs’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte, 
(), pp. –; Hans-Georg Aschoff, Welfische Bewegung und politischer Katholizismus,
– (Düsseldorf, ).
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The debates which ensued in the Prussian parliament, the Landtag, are a case
in point. Despite the confident assertion by Ernst Rudolf Huber, one of the
doyens of modern German constitutional history, that debellatio offered suffi-
cient cause for the incorporation of Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and the
city of Frankfurt into Prussia, the sub-committee tasked with the preparation
of the bill apparently felt less sure because it advised the government to ‘find
another legal justification than [the right of] conquest. It amounts to naked
coercion, which does no longer suffice for law- and state-building in the
present time’. At least Bluntschli was prepared to countenance ‘despotic
acts’ if public necessity called for it, though such a case was difficult to make
for straight-up conquest because Prussia did not even adopt a law for the expro-
priation of private property in the common interest until . The
Heidelberg professor therefore resorted to a higher justification, namely the
will of the nation to be united, and warned that since the ‘free course of
Germany [had been] hemmed in and led down the garden path by dynastic
legitimacy’ for too long, Prussia should abandon her own ‘superstitious infatu-
ation with legitimacy’. Prussia’s minister president, Otto von Bismarck,
readily adopted Bluntschli’s line of reasoning to defend the annexations.
In so doing, he could rely on the emerging popularity of Realpolitik, a new
system of thought inspired by Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory, which
held that assertiveness rather than morals, rights, or respect for historical prece-
dent was the key to national survival.
To lend weight to the claim that conquest was in the national interest,
Bismarck had to make the people, as represented by the Landtag, the arbiter
of the settlements between the Prussian crown and the deposed princes.
However, historians have often marvelled why Bismarck had parliament vote
on the agreements in February , only to sequester Georg V’s and
Friedrich Wilhelm I’s assets one month later. The two most prominent explana-
tions are that he either acted out of genuine disappointment about the two
monarchs’ unabated enmity towards Prussia or that he wanted to secure a
slush fund free from parliamentary control. However, both answers miss an
important detail: Bismarck sought parliamentary confirmation for all major
 Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit , III (nd edn, Stuttgart, ),
pp. –; Stephan Verosta, ‘Die Völkerrechtswidrigkeit der Annexion Hannovers durch
’, in Dieter Blumenwitz and Albrecht Randelzhofer, eds., Festschrift für Friedrich Berber
zum . Geburtstag (Munich, ), p. .
 Bluntschli, Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch, p. ; Lars Menninger, Die Inanspruchnahme
Privater durch den Staat: Das Recht der Aufopferung und Enteignung im . und . Jahrhundert
(Baden-Baden, ), p. .
 Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Denkwürdiges aus meinem Leben, III (Nordlingen, ), p. .
 Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck, the man and the statesman, trans. Arthur John Butler, II
(New York, NY, ), pp. –.
 Johannes Paulmann, Globale Vorherrschaft und Fortschritt: Europa, – (Munich,
), pp. –; Karl-Georg Faber, ‘Realpolitik als Ideologie: Die Bedeutung des Jahres
 für das politische Denken in Deutschland’, Historische Zeitschrift,  (), pp. –.
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measures regarding the exiled dynasties and did the same for treaties con-
cluded with Standesherren since . Although this move strengthened the
Prussian legislature, the legal counsel of Duke Engelbert-August von
Arenberg was probably right to suspect that Bismarck considered this an accept-
able price to pay for the opportunity to hide behind the Landtag as he dispos-
sessed his sovereign’s peers. Attentive to the legitimatory force of public
opinion, the conservative jurist Carl Ludwig von Haller had warned as early
as  that only treaties which could count on broad backing guaranteed
the ‘completion’ of conquest.
The common front of the Prussian crown and parliament against rival clai-
mants of sovereignty gathered further momentum as the unified Kaiserreich
took shape after . With the dissolution of the German Confederation,
the mediatized princes had lost the protection of their vestigial sovereign
rights under international law, and the Reichstag took full advantage of this to
pass legislation which gradually standardized German citizenship over the
next four decades, culminating in the Civil Code of . The Prussian
crown also scored a victory when Elector Friedrich Wilhelm I’s heir acknowl-
edged the incorporation of his patrimony into the Hohenzollern monarchy
as an ‘irrevocable constitutional act’ in return for an increase of the dividends
payable to the beneficiaries of the Brabant dynasty’s entailed estate (since the
sequestration had in the meantime been lifted). Eventually, even relations
with the Prussian royal family’s most steadfast critics, the Guelphs, mellowed.
In , their sequestrated property was returned to them, clearing the path
for the betrothal of the Guelph heir to Kaiser Wilhelm II’s only daughter and
the couple’s accession to the ducal throne of Brunswick in .
Intriguingly, however, the decline of Germany’s dethroned sovereigns as a pol-
itical threat to Hohenzollern legitimacy coincided with an upgrading of their
symbolic prestige through titles and ceremonial privileges. Wilhelm II
courted the indifferent Hanoverian Standesherr Duke Engelbert-Maria von
Arenberg with some success and elevated several princely families to higher
peerages (including the Stolberg-Wernigerodes). After , the Kaiser simi-
larly assumed the co-protectorate of various commemorative projects alongside
the Hanoverian and Nassowian royal families to burnish his image as a defender
of the annexed provinces’ heritage. The elaborateness of this pageantry bore
 Beusch, ‘Westfälische Standesherren’, pp. –.
 Heinrich Zoepfl, Rechtsgutachten über die von der Königlich-Preußischen Staatsregierung beab-
sichtigte neue gesetzliche Regulirung des standesherrlichen Rechtszustandes des Herzogs von Arenberg
wegen des Herzogthums Arenberg-Meppen (Hanover, ), p. .
 Carl Ludwig von Haller, Restauration der Staats-Wissenschaft oder Theorie des natürlich-geselligen
Zustands der Chimäre des künstlich-bürgerlichen entgegengesetzt, II (Winterthur, ), p. .
 Treaty reprinted in Hopf, ed., Die deutsche Krisis, pp. –.
 See Ute Daniel and Christian K. Frey, eds., Die preußisch-welfische Hochzeit, 
(Brunswick, ).
 Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren, pp. –.
 Heinzen, ‘Monarchical state-building through state destruction’, pp. , –.
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witness to the monarchy-centred nature of German politics between  and
the First World War, but at the same time the involvement of multiple dynasties
offers one final reminder that the symbolic capital of deposed princes could be
useful where overt markers of sovereignty like the exercise of physical control
over a given territory, the ability to make laws, or the acquiescence of the inter-
national community were insufficient on their own to ensure people’s identifi-
cation with the official head of state.
I V
Conquest and subjugation are potent drivers of history. The French philoso-
pher Grégoire Chamayou has called this will to dominate ‘cynegetic energy’
because it ‘gathers together what is scattered, centralizes and accumulates in
a limitless logic of annexation’. The phenomenon Chamayou describes is a
common trope in the literature on the birth of the modern state: the creation
of standing armies and the expansion of bureaucratic infrastructures put gov-
ernments in a position to bring rival bearers of jurisdiction under their
control and, where possible, to eliminate them. Legal codes became standar-
dized and, in time, the state gained legal personality distinct from the sover-
eignty of the ruler. The late nineteenth-century German sociologist Max
Weber famously coined the phrase ‘the disenchantment of the world’ to
describe this relentless onslaught of rationalization and standardization. As
the melancholic undertone of Weber’s words suggests, however, he felt that
something important was being lost in the process, for the disappearance of
ancient institutions and customs raised uncomfortable questions about the dir-
ection of the future.
This article has explored Prussian state-building from the rather less familiar
angle of the vanquished ‘victims’. It has argued that for much of the nineteenth
century sovereignty remained a contested resource due to the difficult political,
legal, and ethical implications of conquest, the reluctance of former elites to
 Grégoire Chamayou, Manhunts: a philosophical history (Princeton, NJ, ), p. .
 See Jeroen Duindam, Dynasties: a global history of power, – (Cambridge, ),
pp. –; Dieter Grimm, Constitutionalism: past, present, and future (Oxford, ), p. ;
Wolfgang Reinhard, ‘Das Wachstum der Staatsgewalt: Historische Reflexionen’, Der Staat, 
(), p. ; Andreas Pec ̌ar, ‘Dynastien –Träger der Staatsbildung? Überlegungen zu
Herrschaft und Staatsbildung in kulturvergleichender Perspektive anlässlich einer prominen-
ten Neuerscheinung’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung,  (), pp. –. As Bridget
Coggins’s succinct summary of the quantitative evidence gathered by the Correlates of War
Project highlights, ‘[s]tate births were rare in the nineteenth century and state deaths, or
violent conquests, were more frequent than they are today’. Bridget Coggins, ‘Friends in
high places: international politics and the emergence of states from secession’, International
Organization,  (), p. .
 MaxWeber, ‘The profession and vocation of politics’, in MaxWeber, Political writings, ed.
Peter Lassman and trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge, ), p. ; Peter Lassman, ‘The rule
of man over man: politics, power and legitimation’, in Stephen Turner, ed., The Cambridge com-
panion to Weber (Cambridge, ), pp. –.
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part with their sovereignty, and the services that Unterlandesherren could render
the state. To be more precise, the dispossession of fellow dynasts threatened to
undermine the fiction of historical continuity that lay at the heart of the monar-
chical principle and accounts for the eagerness of successive generations of
Prussian monarchs to win the acquiescence of their defeated peers through
treaties and symbolic acts of reconciliation. Conquest moreover evoked nega-
tive memories of the Napoleonic Wars, which is why pro-Prussian legal minds
like Brockhaus and Bluntschli had to go to considerable lengths to justify it.
Finally, while it may have been true in a very broad sense, as Richard J. Evans
writes, that after  the ‘prince or ruler became, in effect, the executor of
national or state sovereignty guaranteed by international agreement with the
virtual force of law’, the destruction and territorial changes caused by the
Napoleonic Wars meant that the Prussian monarchy for a long time lacked
the means to carry its will into effect locally. Dynasties with deep roots in
the community were better placed to transmit a ‘personalized and intimate
idea of sovereignty’ (to borrow Frank Mort’s expression), which created an
opening for them to stay relevant in a century of dramatic sea-changes.
The interplay of all the above strands makes clear that in practice sovereignty
was never a unitary concept, even in a system like Prussia’s where the defenders
of the monarchical principle held fast to the Bodinian tradition. As a result,
Prussian state-building was replete with jurisdictional ambiguities and reversals
of fortune, thanks to which fallen potentates managed to preserve and some-
times even to claw back attributes of sovereignty. As late as October ,
King Wilhelm I and his ministers postponed a decision on whether Count
Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode should be permitted to keep his comital govern-
ment (Regierung) and approve charitable donations in his domains in lieu of the
king.
This dynamic relationship between Prussia’s kings, quasi-sovereigns, and
absent monarchs tells a global story. Polities – and in the nineteenth century
most were still presided over by monarchs of some description – competed
with each other for people, land, influence, and resources. In a twist on the
Hobbesian state of nature, this made kings each other’s wolf (rex regi lupus).
‘African Bonapartes’ like the Nyamwezi chief Mbula Mtyela or the famed
Zulu king Shaka participated in this game of mutual elimination just as much
as European monarchs that inflicted a slow death of dismemberment on the
once mighty Ottoman Empire. Yet superior strength did not automatically
confer full sovereignty on the new occupant of a conquered territory. Among
 Richard J. Evans, The pursuit of power: Europe, – (London, ), p. .
 Frank Mort, ‘Safe for democracy: constitutional politics, popular spectacle, and the
British monarchy, –’, Journal of British Studies,  (), p. .
 Protocol of the Ministry of State meeting,  Oct. , in Rainer Paetau and Hartwin
Spenkuch, eds., Die Protokolle des Preußischen Staatsministeriums, VI/I (Hildesheim, ), p. .
 Dieter Langewiesche, ‘Monarchy – global: monarchical self-assertion in a republican
world’, Journal of Modern European History,  (), pp. –.
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‘civilized nations’, customary law, international conventions, the clout of ‘indi-
genous intermediaries’, the political will of the international community, and
public opinion came together in a spectrum of possible outcomes, which
stretched from outright annexation to the establishment of protectorates and
the sharing of jurisdiction within condominia. The brutality unleashed by
wars of conquest in and outside Europe make it easy to overlook those subtle
in-between solutions. Some historians rightly stress that while conquerors
have come and gone, political experiments with divided sovereignty have
proved remarkably durable, if not to say successful. Condominia have been
an attractive model of political organization for at least two-and-a-half millennia
because of their ability to make rivals work with rather than against each
other. In an undisguised nod to the travails of Brexit, Beatrice Heuser
comes to similar conclusions about federal unions:
one power’s absolute sovereignty is another’s absolute insecurity, and one power’s
sovereign right to use war as an instrument of its policy is another's sovereign
right to attack it. Neither furthers stability. Sovereignty, and that is the lesson of
the Holy Roman Empire, can instead be shared at several levels. Subsidiarity – the
principle that decisions should be made at the lowest level possible – was widely
practised even there.
The contestation and negotiation of the monarchical principle in Prussia
between  and  has relevance for Heuser’s poignant statement. The
world German kings and statesmen inhabited after Napoleon’s fall still relied
on the multilateral frameworks of the Holy Roman Empire for orientation,
but at the same time these actors were not immune to new notions of national
sovereignty, which served to centralize power in the hands of a few. Like govern-
ments today, they faced a political crossroads at which the future could turn
either way.
 Alexander Jendorff, ‘Gemeinsam Herrschen: Das alteuropäische Kondominat und das
Herrschaftsverständnis der Moderne’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung,  (), p. .
 Beatrice Heuser, Brexit in history: sovereignty or a European union? (Oxford, ), p. .
 J A S P E R H E I N Z E N
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X20000333
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.21.52.57, on 29 Jun 2021 at 13:27:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
